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Tort Law. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d
676 (R.I. 1999). Because a surviving spouse is not legally entitled
to recover damages in a wrongful death action where he or she neg-
ligently caused the decedent's death, the surviving spouse does not
take priority over the decedent's next of kin pursuant to section 10-
7-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws. In addition, section 33-1.1
of the Rhode Island General Laws (the Slayer's Act), does not apply
where the surviving spouse did not willfully and unlawfully take
the decedent's life.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Raymond Pelchat (Raymond) and Bonnie Lynn Pelchat (Bon-
nie Lynn) were married on May 13, 1989.1 After leaving their wed-
ding reception in the early morning hours of May 14, 1989, the two
were in an automobile accident that killed Bonnie Lynn.2 Ray-
mond, who was driving the car, subsequently pled nolo contendere
to a charge of driving under the influence, death resulting, on June
3, 1991. 3
A wrongful death suit was filed by the administrator of Bonnie
Lynn's estate, pursuant to section 10-7-1.1 of the Rhode Island
General Laws,4 naming Raymond and others as defendants.5
Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial Union), the
plaintiff in the instant case, insured the car, which was owned by
Bonnie Lynn.6 Pursuant to Bonnie Lynn's policy, Commercial
Union defended Raymond in the wrongful death suit.7 Meanwhile,
the probate court denied any inheritance to Raymond by invoking
the Slayer's Act."
Subsequently, in November of 1992, Commercial Union filed a
declaratory judgment action hoping to relieve themselves of repre-
senting or indemnifying Raymond in the wrongful death suit filed
by Bonnie Lynn's estate.9 In response, both parties filed motions
for summary judgment, which were both denied by a superior court
1. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 679; R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-1.1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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judge. 10 In denying the motions, the court relied on O'Leary v.
Bingham," which states that a trial court can "not make a deter-
mination as to the identity of beneficiaries until a judgment has
been entered awarding damages. "12
Preceding a hearing on the wrongful death action, a settle-
ment was reached between Raymond and Bonnie Lynn's estate. 13
As required by the terms of the settlement, Raymond admitted to
liability in Bonnie Lynn's death and submitted to judgment. 14
This judgment, however, was stayed so that the proper benefi-
ciaries of the wrongful death proceeds could be determined. 15
Commercial Union then renewed the motion for summary
judgment before a different justice. 16 This motion was also denied
by the trial justice, who ruled in favor of Bonnie Lynn's estate.' 7
Although the trial justice found that Raymond and Bonnie Lynn
were legally married at the time of the accident, he rejected Com-
mercial Union's argument that the marriage terminated any rights
Bonnie Lynn's parents had to damages in the wrongful death ac-
tion. 8 Moreover, the trial justice accepted the administrator's ar-
gument that the Slayer's Act was applicable, denying Raymond
recovery of benefits under the Act. 19 Therefore, the trial justice
determined that Bonnie Lynn's parents were her legal next of kin
and were entitled to recover the wrongful death benefits.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The wrongful death act "confers a right of action on certain
enumerated individuals to recover damages for the death of a fam-
ily member."21 Sections 10-7-122 and 10-7-223 describe the reasons
for allowing such recovery and denote who is entitled to such a re-
10. See id.
11. 159 A.2d 619 (R.I, 1960).
12. Commercial Union, 727 A.2d at 679 (quoting O'Leary, 159 A.2d at 619).
13. See id. at 679.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id. (citing Presley v. Newport Hospital, 365 A.2d 748, 749-50 (R.I. 1976)).
22. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
23. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
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covery.24 Section 10-7-1 states that when the death of a person is
the result of a negligent act of another, the actor is liable for dam-
ages resulting from the negligence. 25 Section 10-7-2 prescribes
who may recover from the negligent acts of another when a wrong-
ful death ensues. 26 This statute gives first priority to spouses and
children of the decedent. 27 If no children are in existance at the
time of death, the spouse then recovers the entire amount.28 If no
spouse exists, the recovery belongs to the decedent's next of kin, as
if she had died intestate.29
The critical inquiry for the supreme court was whether a
spouse "existed" for purposes of the statute where that spouse
caused the decedent's death. Under section 10-7-2, Bonnie Lynn's
parents are the next of kin.30 Therefore, they would be entitled to
the proceeds of the wrongful death action if, for purposes of the
statute, Raymond did not qualify as an "existing spouse."31 How-
ever, Commercial Union argued that since Raymond was alive at
the time of his wife's death, the language of the statute directed
that he was the only legal beneficiary of the wrongful death
award. 32
To guide its interpretation of section 10-7-2, the supreme court
looked to the purpose of the wrongful death act, which was enacted
to avoid the "harsh [common law] rule" that prevented a decedent's
family from recovering damages for a wrongful death.33 The court
also looked to its prior holding in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
Curley.34 In Curley, a sole heir was prohibited from recovering
damages in a wrongful death action because she was the proximate
cause of the decedent's death. 35 Public policy dictates that when a
beneficiary is the proximate cause of the death, he or she is pre-
cluded from recovering under the act.3 6 A contrary reading of the
24. See Commercial Union Ins. Co., 727 A.2d at 680-81.
25. See id. at 680.
26. See id. at 681.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. 585 A.2d 640 (R.I. 1991).
35. See Commercial Union, 727 A.2d at 681-82.
36. See id.
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statute would result in an absurd result, since "a negligent wrong-
doer [would] benefit from his or her own wrongful act."
37
While Curley held that the person who negligently caused the
death of the decedent should not be able to recover under section
10-7-2, it did not address whether "decedent's next of kin recover if
the decedent's husband is alive, but not legally entitled to re-
cover?"38 Looking at the plain language of the statute, the
supreme court interpreted "if there is no husband" to mean "if
there is no husband legally entitled to recover."39 Consequently,
the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and
held that as next of kin, Bonnie Lynn's parents were entitled to
recover benefits from the wrongful death action.40
Although reaching the same result as the trial court, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court refused to apply the Slayer's Act to
the present case.4 ' The Slayer's Act prohibits "slayers from bene-
fiting from their own wrongful conduct."4 2 The language of section
33-1.1-1(3) of the Rhode Island General Laws defines slayer to be
"any person who willfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be
taken the life of another."43 The court read this language in a con-
junctive manner and concluded that Raymond's actions were not
willful and unlawful.44 Based on this determination, the court
found the Slayer's Act to be inapplicable.4 5 The court further
stated that the Slayer's Act "is relevant to our holding here only
insofar as it contributed to and informed the doctrine that we es-
tablished in Curley."4 6
CONCLUSION
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court held that, for purposes of section 10-7-2 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, a spouse must be legally entitled to
recover damages in a wrongful death action before he or she takes
37. Id. at 682 (quoting Curley, 585 A.2d at 643).
38. Commercial Union, 727 A.2d at 682.
39. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-2).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 682-83.
42. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1.1-15 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
43. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws §33-1.1-1(3) (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
44. See id. at 683.
45. See id. at 682-83.
46. Id. at 683.
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priority over the decedent's next of kin. The court rejected the ap-
plication of the Slayer's Act in a wrongful death action, and instead
employed a public policy analysis to conclude that the decedent's
next of kin should recover damages under a wrongful death action
where the decedent's husband was the proximate cause of her
death.
Danielle T. Jenkins
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Tort Law. Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198 (R.I. 1999). The
owner of a car is liable under Rhode Island General Laws section
31-33-6 for the intentional acts of his/her agents. Therefore, the
lessee of an automobile is responsible for the intentional acts of
other drivers permitted to operate that vehicle.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 12, 1993, plaintiff Michael R. Dias (Dias) and some
friends were riding their motorcycles on Route 146 North.' As
Dias and his friends traveled down the road, a black Nissan driven
by the defendant, Richard Cinquegrana (Richard), passed between
the riders "at a high rate of speed."2 When Dias and his friends
later saw Richard at a stop sign, they exchanged words with him.3
As the plaintiff pulled away from the stop sign, Richard intention-
ally drove into his motorcycle, causing serious injury to Dias.4
Dias filed a personal injury complaint against Richard, but
quickly amended the complaint to include Nissan Motor Accept-
ance Corporation and Virginia Cinquegrana (Virginia), Richard's
mother and the lessee of the vehicle.5 At the conclusion of the
trial, Virginia moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
asserting "that she was not liable because the word 'accident' in
section 31-33-6 did not encompass intentional torts."6 Following a
jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial justice determined that sec-
tion 31-33-6 of the Rhode Island General Laws included both inten-
tional and unintentional acts, and denied Virginia's motion for a
judgment in her favor. 7
After her renewed motion was denied, Virginia promptly ap-
pealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the stat-
ute only imposes liability on an automobile owner where the
driver's accidental conduct causes injury.8
1. See Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198, 199 (R.I. 1999).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id. "At trial, the parties stipulated that 'the action of Richard Cin-
quegrana in striking, using the 1993 Nissan Maxima to strike the motorcycle and
person of the Plaintiff, Michael Diaz [sic] was intentional.'" Id. at 199 n.1.
5. See id. at 199.
6. Id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-33-6 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
7. See id.
8. See id.
20001
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized that section 31-
33-6 of the Rhode Island General Laws modifies the common law
by "extending the liability of an automobile owner to situations in
which no common law agency relationship existed."9 In relevant
part, statute 31-33-6 states:
Owners liability for acts of others.-Whenever any motor ve-
hicle shall be used, operated, or caused to be operated upon
any public highway of this state with the consent of the
owner, or lessee, or bailee, thereof, expressed or implied, the
driver thereof, if other than the owner, or lessee, or bailee,
shall in the case of an accident be deemed to be the agent of
the owner, or lessee, or bailee, of the motor vehicle unless the
driver shall have furnished proof of financial responsibility
... prior to the accident .... 10
The court emphasized the purpose of section 31-33-6 "is to en-
sure that a victim of a car injury has an avenue of recovery." 1 ' The
court then set forth to determine whether the term "accident" in
this statute includes intentional acts. 12 Because section 31-33-6
does not provide an explicit definition of the term "accident," the
Rhode Island Supreme Court considered the public policy goals of
the legislature in interpreting this statute. 13 Reviewing section
31-33-6 in this context, the court held that the term encompasses
intentional as well as accidental acts. 14 Realizing the breadth of
its interpretation, the court highlighted the consistency of this de-
cision "with the purpose of § 31-33-6, namely, to protect an inno-
cent victim from having to shoulder the expense of an injury."' 5
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also relied upon its previous
interpretation of the term "accident" in State v. Smyth. 16 In that
case, which involved a statute "requiring a participant in a high-
way accident to render aid to persons injured in the collision, [the
9. Id. (citing Ostrosky v. Sczapa, 739 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D.R.I. 1990)).
10. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-33-6 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
11. Dias, 727 A.2d at 199.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 200.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. 397 A.2d 497 (R.I. 1979). See generally R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-26-1 (1956)
(Supp. 1999) (requiring drivers to stop when involved in an accident resulting in
injury).
SURVEY SECTION
court] determined that 'the Legislature intended the term 'acci-
dent' to include all automobile highway collisions-intentional as
well as unintentional-where personal injury occurs.'" 17 Addition-
ally, the court mentioned its decision in General Accident Insur-
ance Company of America v. Olivier,18 where it cited a Florida case
that reasoned "'from the perspective of the injured party, an inten-
tional shooting constituted 'a most unexpected and unfortunate
accident.'"19
Likewise, from Dias' perspective, Richard Cinquegrana's in-
tentional conduct resulted in an unfortunate accident. Therefore,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that Richard's conduct
was covered by the term "accident" in section 31-3-6, and held that
the lessee of the car was liable for the injuries caused by Richard's
conduct. 20
CONCLUSION
In Dias v. Cinquegrana, the Rhode Island Supreme Court de-
termined that the term "accident" in Rhode Island General Laws
section 31-33-6 includes intentional acts. Therefore, the owner or
lessee of an automobile is liable for the intentional as well as acci-
dental acts of persons allowed to operate that vehicle.2 1
John B. Garry
17. Dias, 727 A.2d at 200 (quoting Smyth, 397 A.2d at 499).
18. 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990).
19. Dias, 727 A.2d at 200 (quoting Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1242).
20. See id.
21. The court points out that its decision only "affects the liability of a vehicle
owner for the acts of the driver under § 31-33-6; it does not delineate what is or is
not covered under any particular insurance policy." Id.
20001 809
810 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601
Tort Law. Gelsomino v. Mendonca, 723 A.2d 300 (R.I. 1999).
Where a defendant-employer contributed to an injured plaintiffs
disability payments and/or a pension fund, the collateral source
doctrine does not bar a deduction from loss of earnings or other
expenses to the extent of the defendant-employer's contributions.
The burden is upon the defendant-employer to prove the propor-
tion of a plaintiff-employee's benefits, resulting from the defend-
ant-employer's contributions.
In Gelsomino v. Mendonca,' the plaintiff, a school teacher em-
ployed by the City of Central Falls, sued the City of Central Falls
and a Central Falls police officer. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that although the police officer was prevented by the
collateral source doctrine from deducting the plaintiffs employ-
ment-related disability compensation from the damages owed to
the plaintiff, the doctrine did not prevent the City of Central Falls
from deducting from the plaintiff's damages the amount of plain-
tiffs disability or pension payments funded by the City of Central
Falls.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 7, 1991, while pursuing an automobile that ran a
red light, Officer James Mendonca (Officer Mendonca), of the Cen-
tral Falls Police Department, lost control of his police cruiser and
slammed into a temporary trailer where Marie Gelsomino (Gel-
somino), a Central Falls school teacher, was conducting class. 2
Gelsomino sued Officer Mendonca and the City of Central Falls
(City) for negligence, claiming that as a result of the accident she
suffered pain in her lower back and leg, preventing her from dis-
charging her responsibilities as an elementary school teacher as
well as participating in her daily and leisure activities. 3
In a court-annexed arbitration, Gelsomino was awarded
$120,000. 4 Gelsomino rejected the award, preferring to send the
case to trial. 5 Thereafter, a jury awarded Gelsomino $25,000 in
1. 723 A.2d 300 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 301.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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damages. 6 Prejudgment interest was added to the verdict against
Officer Mendonca, but was not added to the verdict against the
City.7 Officer Mendonca moved to strike the award of prejudgment
interest, arguing that as a city employee, he was exempted from
such an award.8 Gelsomino moved for a new trial and/or additur.9
The trial justice granted Officer Mendonca's motion, and denied
Gelsomino's motion.' 0
Gelsomino filed an appeal, raising several issues." She ar-
gued that the admission of evidence regarding her disability pen-
sion violated the collateral source doctrine, and that the jury
should have been instructed to not consider the disability pension
when computing damages. 12 Gelsomino also argued that the trial
justice erred by granting Officer Mendonca's motion to strike the
award of prejudgment interest.' 3
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The collateral source doctrine declares that compensation for
an injured party made by sources other than the tortfeasor is inad-
missible evidence and does not reduce the tortfeasor's liability. 14
The purpose of the rule is to prevent the tortfeasor from receiving
the benefit of compensation paid to the plaintiff by a third party by
reducing the damages owed to the plaintiff in the amount of com-
pensation provided by the third party.15 Since it is the tortfeasor's
responsibility to make the injured person whole again, it is irrele-
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. Gelsomino also appealed the trial justice's denial of a "thin skull"
jury instruction, and the denial of her motion for a new trial and/or additur. Since
the court concluded that Gelsomino was entitled to a new trial for a proper applica-
tion of the collateral source doctrine, it did not reach Gelsomino's arguments re-
garding the trial justice's denial of her motion for a new trial. See id. at 303. The
court also held that a "thin skull" jury instruction should be given if Gelsomino
presented evidence that the accident affected her pre-existing herniated disk. See
id. at 302.
12. See id. at 301.
13. See id.
14. See id. (citing Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270, 1272 (R.I.
1993)).
15. See id. (citing Oddo v. Cardi, 218 A.2d 373, 377 (R.I. 1966)).
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vant that an independent party has made payments to the injured
person. 16
Applying the collateral source doctrine to the present case, the
supreme court concluded that because Officer Mendonca did not
provide any pecuniary benefits to the plaintiff, the collateral source
doctrine prevented any deduction from damages owed to Gel-
somino as a result of Officer Mendonca's negligence.' 7
The court then considered the application of the doctrine with
regards to the liability of the City. The court first cited its earlier
opinion of Colvin v. Goldberg,'8 where it suggested that when a
plaintiff sues her employer, the employer may be entitled to deduct
from the plaintiffs damages any sums or benefits paid to the plain-
tiff by the employer. 19 While acknowledging that the majority rule
is to refuse to deduct from the plaintiffs damages the amount of a
plaintiffs pension fund paid for by the employer, 20 the court con-
cluded "that the better rule would be to allow a deduction from loss
of earnings or other expenses to the extent that the disability pay-
ments and/or pension or other disbursements have been funded by
or are attributable to contributions by the employer, in this case
the City of Central Falls."21
The court also held that the burden is on the employer to show
the portion of the plaintiffs disability pension or other benefits
paid to the plaintiff by the employer.22 Noting that a new trial was
required, the court suggested that the City be directed to show that
portion of employee benefits and/or pension, which resulted from
employer contributions, prior to the admission of evidence concern-
ing the plaintiffs receipt of such benefits and/or pension.23 In the
event that the City is unable to provide proof of its contribution to
Gelsomino's disability pension, the collateral source doctrine bars
any evidence of the disability pension or other benefits. 24
Finally, the court addressed Gelsomino's argument that the
trial justice erred by striking the prejudgment interest added to
16. See id. (citing Colvin v. Goldenberg, 273 A.2d 663, 666 (R.I. 1971)).
17. See id. at 302.
18. 273 A.2d 663 (R.I. 1971).
19. See Gelsomino, 723 A.2d at 302.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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the award against Officer Mendonca. The court agreed that the
ruling of the trial justice was in error. In Pridemore v. Napoli-
tano,25 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that government em-
ployees who are liable in tort are not entitled to the same
exemption for prejudgment interest as are municipalities. 26
Therefore, the ruling of the trial justice was impermissible, and
any award against Officer Mendonca must be enlarged by the ap-
propriate amount of prejudgment interest.27
CONCLUSION
In Gelsomino v. Mendonca, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
carved out an exception to the collateral source doctrine. Where a
defendant-employer can show that it contributed to the disability
payments, pension payments, or any other disbursements made to
the plaintiff, the defendant-employer is entitled to deduct an
amount equal to the contributions it made from the damages owed
to the plaintiff. However, the burden of proving the portion of the
disability fund or pension paid by the defendant-employer for the
benefit of the plaintiff is on the defendant-employer. An inability
to prove what portion of those benefits are attributable to the de-
fendant-employer renders the exception inapplicable.
Sarah K. Heaslip
25. 689 A.2d 1053 (R.I. 1997).
26. See id. at 1056.
27. See Gelsomino, 723 A.2d at 302-03.
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Tort Law. Hawkins v. Scituate Oil Co., Inc., 723 A.2d 771 (R.I.
1999). A plaintiff in a negligence action alleging harm to real prop-
erty may recover damages for any resulting inconvenience, discom-
fort, and annoyance. There is a distinction between cases
involving a tortious interference with real property and those
claiming an intentional or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. In those cases pertaining to real property, potentially frivo-
lous allegations of personal injuries are less of an evidentiary
concern; therefore, it is unnecessary to require medical or physical
evidence prior to allowing a recovery of damages for discomfort and
annoyance.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In October 1993, a Scituate Oil Co., Inc. delivery man made a
mistake. He "pumped 100 gallons of home heating oil down the
wrong pipe" at the plaintiffs' Glocester residence.' As a result of
their flooded basement and uninhabitable home, the plaintiffs
moved into a small trailer until a new house was built on the same
property.2 In September of 1996, there was a partial settlement
but the plaintiffs remaining claims were set for a damages trial.3
The trial justice granted the defendant's motion for judgment
as a matter of law, relying "upon the lack of expert medical testi-
mony to buttress plaintiffs' damage claims for the alleged incon-
venience, discomfort, and annoyance they suffered as a result of
their oleaginous eviction."4 The plaintiffs appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, alleging that the trial justice had commit-
ted reversible error in granting the defendant's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law.5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
that it has permitted the recovery of damages for tortious interfer-
ence with possessory interests in real property.6 Additionally, the
1. 723 A.2d 771 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 772.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See id. (citing Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321 (R.I. 1995); Vogel v.
McAuliffe, 18 R.I. 791 (1895)).
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majority rule from other jurisdictions allows the recovery of dam-
ages for the annoyance and irritation caused by the tortious inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of real property.7 Finally, the
court looked to section 929 of the Restatement (Second) Torts,
which states in relevant part: "(1) If one is entitled to a judgment
for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting
to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation
for... (c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant."8
Having established the clear legal precedent for awarding
damages in cases involving a tortious interference with real prop-
erty interests, the court distinguished this type of case from those
asserting an intentional or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.9 In cases alleging an intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must show that he has suffered
physical symptoms related to the emotional distress, and that ex-
pert medical evidence corroborates the existence of a nexus be-
tween the defendant's tortious conduct and the plaintiffs
injuries.' 0 However, in diminution of property cases like this one,
7. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'r v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo.
1986); Evans v. Mutual Mining, 485 S.E.2d 695 (W.Va. 1997); Piorkowski v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 228 N.W.2d 695 (Wis. 1975)).
8. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 929 (1979)). Comment (e) to
this section further explains this rule:
Discomfort and other bodily and mental harms. Discomfort and annoy-
ance to an occupant of the land and to the members of the household are
distinct grounds of compensation for which in ordinary cases the person in
possession is allowed to recover for his own serious sickness or other sub-
stantial bodily harm but is not allowed to recover for serious harm to
other members of the household, except so far as he maintains an action
as a spouse or parent....
Id. at 772-73.
9. See Hawkins, 723 A.2d. at 773. For cases discussing intentional or negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, see Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 862-64
(R.I. 1998) (neighbor's surveillance and photographing of landowners and report-
ing violation did not constitute intentional or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress); Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 838-40 (R.I. 1997) (expert testimony
concerning physical syptoms allegedly resulting from improper sexual conduct of
attorney failed to establish claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 812-14 (R.I. 1996) (unsup-
ported conclusory assertions of physical ills caused by a television station did not
prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Reilly v. United
States, 547 A.2d 894 (R.I. 1988) (parents of a severely brain damaged child could
not recover damages against the obstetrician for negligent infliction of emotional
distress unless they suffered verifiable physical symptoms).
10. See id.
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it is not required to demand "evidence of physical symptomatology
plus medical causation expertise before allowing such plaintiffs to
recover damages for their resulting discomfort and annoyance.""'
In sum, the court took notice of the fact that property-loss victims
like the plaintiffs will certainly encounter inconvenience and dis-
pleasure, which may not be supported by physical symptoms or
medical testimony, and unlike mere emotional distress claims,
there is no public policy requirement to deter disingenuous
claims. 12
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the trial justice
erred in approving the defendant's motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law because a claim for tortious interference of one's enjoy-
ment of property does not necessitate proof of physical injuries
supported by medical expertise. On retrial, the plaintiffs will be
permitted to proffer evidence of their discomfort and annoyance,
and to recover for such injuries without the requirement for con-
curring medical verification of physical symptoms.
John B. Garry
11. Id.
12. See id.
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Tort Law. Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 740
A.2d 1243 (R.I. 1999). In an action alleging premises liability, a
common carrier owes a potential passenger a duty to exercise the
highest degree of care that is consistent with the orderly conduct of
its business. The duty is triggered when the potential passenger
enters the common carrier's premises with the intention of becom-
ing a passenger.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) owned a
parcel of real estate that was used as a turnaround where passen-
gers were permitted to board its buses.' Approximately 200 pas-
sengers passed through this turnaround each day.2 No signs were
posted in the area warning passengers of a possible safety hazard. 3
On June 8, 1995, the plaintiff, seventy-seven year old Jean
Kelly (Kelly), walked across the property in order to reach the bus
shelter where a bus was to stop.4 When Kelly crossed the turn-
around area, two RIPTA buses were waiting for passengers to
board.5 As the plaintiff continued to traverse the turnaround area,
one of the buses started its engine and pulled away, hitting the
plaintiff and running over her leg.6 At trial, the RIPTA bus driver
testified that he did not see the plaintiff until after the accident
occurred. 7
Initially, Kelly brought an action in superior court alleging
negligence only on the part of the bus driver; RIPTA was joined as
a defendant under the doctrine of respondeat superior.8 After
trial, the jury found in favor of both defendants. 9 The trial justice
then granted Kelly's motion for a new trial, reasoning that no rea-
sonable jury could have found that Kelly was 100% responsible for
1. See Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1245
(R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1246.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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her own injuries.10 In addition, the trial justice found that a por-
tion of the bus driver's testimony was not credible."'
In the second trial, a jury awarded Kelly $340,293.93 plus in-
terest, finding RIPTA liable for the maintenance and management
of its premises, but finding RIPTA and the driver were not liable
for negligent operation of the bus.12 Both parties appealed and ac-
cordingly, the case was presented to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court on cross-appeals from the superior court. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Motion to Recuse
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first considered the trial jus-
tice's denial of RIPTA's motion for recusal. After the trial justice
granted Kelly's motion for a new trial in the superior court, RIPTA
moved that the trial justice recuse himself from the second trial on
the ground that he could not be impartial.' 4 This claim stemmed
from the trial justice's finding that a portion of the bus driver's tes-
timony was not credible.' 5
The court denied the motion to recuse because both defendants
failed to establish any personal bias or prejudice on the part of the
trial justice.' 6 The court cited the well-recognized rule that a trial
justice should recuse himself when he is unable to render a fair
decision. 17 Moreover, the court declared that a party seeking
recusal of a trial justice must show that the justice has a "personal
bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived or settled opinion of a
character calculated to impair his impartiality seriously and to
sway his judgment."' 8 In the case at bar, the fact that the trial
justice commented on the "credibility of the bus driver and the
weight of the evidence in respect to liability" does not determine
10. See id.
11. RIPTA and the bus driver appealed the granting of the new trial. The
appeal was denied and dismissed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Kelly v.
Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 703 A.2d 1123 (R.I. 1997).
12. Id. at 1245.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 1246.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 1246-47.
17. See id. at 1246 (citing In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653 (R.I. 1992)).
18. Id. (quoting Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 375 A.2d 911, 917 (R.I. 1977)).
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that he was personally biased or partial. 19 Thus, the defendants'
appeal from the denial of the motion to recuse was without merit.20
Mio ,n or Judgnr t as a Matter of Law
The supreme court affirmed the denial of RIPTA's motion for a
judgment as a matter of law.2 1 The court dismissed the motion
notwithstanding RIPTA's contention that Kelly did not present
sufficient evidence to support her premises liability claim, such
that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.22 First, the trial
justice ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff was a passenger
of RIPTA, and thus, RIPTA owed her a duty to exercise the highest
degree of care that is consistent with the regular operation of its
business.23 RIPTA argued that Kelly was not a passenger since
she had not actually boarded the bus.2 4 The court disagreed, how-
ever, because the plaintiff entered the premises with the intention
of becoming a passenger. 25 Therefore, Kelly was a passenger "for
all practical purposes to whom the highest degree of care was
owed."2 6
In light of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the
supreme court held that the trial justice was correct in denying the
motion.27 Both Kelly and RIPTA presented evidence to show that
a large number of RIPTA's potential passengers crossed the turn-
around each day.28 Moreover, it was undisputed that there were
no warning signs or markers to direct pedestrians away from po-
tentially dangerous areas.29 From this evidence, the court stated
that the trial justice was correct in denying the motion.30
19. Id.
20. See id. at 1247.
21. See id. at 1248.
22. See id. at 1247. When ruling on the defendant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the court is obliged to apply the same standard as the trial justice
and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
id. (citing DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 262 (R.I. 1996)).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id. (citing Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 292 U.S.
80 (1934)).
27. See id. at 1248.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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RIPTA's Motion for a New Trial
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied RIPTA's appeal of
the denial of its motion for a new trial.31 RIPTA argued that Kelly
failed to sustain her burden of proof on the premises liability claim
because she did not introduce expert testimony "to determine
whether RIPTA complied with the applicable standard of care."3
2
The court cited the well-established rule that expert testimony is
not required when the jury can easily understand and draw conclu-
sions from the facts and circumstances of the case. 33 The trial jus-
tice concluded that expert testimony was unnecessary because the
issue was one of fundamental safety and "the jury could from its
collective experience determine whether a bus-turnaround area
held open to the public is safe and properly maintained."34 Thus,
the court affirmed the trial justice's ruling because such issues
were neither complex nor beyond the understanding of a reason-
ably prudent juror.35
Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial
Finally, the court also rejected Kelly's motion for a new trial
on the claim of the bus driver's negligence. 36 In the first trial, the
superior court ruled that no reasonable jury could have found that
the bus driver was completely without fault.37 In the second trial,
the trial justice reversed his position, finding that a reasonable
jury could have found that Kelly walked into a spot that was not
visible to the bus driver.38 In short, the trial justice found it en-
tirely reasonable for a jury to conclude that the bus driver was not
at fault in the accident. 39
The supreme court accorded the trial justice the usual deferen-
tial standard of review even though his ruling in the second trial
31. See id. at 1245.
32. Id. at 1248.
33. See id. (citing Allen v. State, 420 A.2d 70 (R.I. 1980)). Indeed, this princi-
ple has been codified in Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. See R.I. R.
Evid. 702.
34. Kelly, 740 A.2d at 1248.
35. See id. at 1248-49.
36. See id. at 1245.
37. See id. at 1250.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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directly opposed his earlier findings.40 The supreme court declared
that it would not disturb such findings unless the trial justice over-
looked or misconstrued evidence, or was clearly wrong in his rul-
ing.41 The supreme court found that the trial justice did not
misconstrue material evidence; the evidence at the second trial
was more persuasive than that which was presented at the first
trial.42 Accordingly, the supreme court sustained the denial of the
plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the issue of the bus driver's
negligence. 43
CONCLUSION
In Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court declared that a person who enters the prem-
ises of a common carrier with the intention of becoming a passen-
ger is for all practical purposes a passenger of the common carrier.
As such, the highest degree of care is owed to the passenger. This
rule extends the duty that a common carrier owes to the public by
requiring the common carrier to ensure the safety of those persons
who have not yet boarded the carrier.
Rory Z. Fazendeiro
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1250 (citing Morrocco v. Piccardi, 674 A.2d 380, 382 (R.I 1996)).
42. See id.
43. See id.
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Tort Law. Rousseau v. KN. Construction, Inc., 727 A.2d 190 (R.I.
1999). The economic loss doctrine, which generally prohibits a
plaintiff from suing in tort for monetary loss alone, does not apply
to consumer transactions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1989, plaintiffs Robert and Claire Rousseau (the Rous-
seaus) bought a parcel of land from K.N. Construction, Inc. (K.N.). 1
K.N. hired Alfred P. Ferreira, now deceased, 2 to conduct a percola-
tion test on the land to determine its suitability for a septic sys-
tem.3 Ferreira's report approved the installation of a septic system
capable of serving a three or four bedroom home.4 The Rousseaus
alleged that they relied on the results when purchasing the land.5
The Rousseaus obtained the approval of the Department of Envi-
ronmental Management (DEM) to construct the septic system, but
decided to put off building the house.6 When the plaintiffs re-
started the project in 1992, DEM notified them that the 1989 septic
system approval had expired, and that they would need to have the
percolation tests redone.7 The new engineering firm hired by the
Rousseaus reported that the land could not sustain a septic system
and that Ferreira's 1989 report was incorrect.8
The Rousseaus sued K.N. on several contract claims and sued
Ferreira for negligence and fraud, seeking damages solely for their
economic loss.9 Prior to trial in superior court, Ferreira moved for
summary judgment, alleging that the economic loss doctrine pre-
cluded the plaintiffs' recovery.' 0 The trial justice agreed with Fer-
reira's statement of the economic loss rule, and entered summary
1. See Rousseau v. K.N. Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 191 (R.I. 1999).
2. Joan Ferreira, on behalf of Alfred Ferreira's estate, was substituted as de-
fendant. See id. at 191 n.1.
3. See id. at 191.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 191-92.
7. See id. at 192.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. The economic loss rule is defined as "[tihe principle that a plaintiff
cannot sue in tort to recover for purely monetary loss-as opposed to physical in-
jury or property damage-caused by the defendant." Black's Law Dictionary 531
(7th ed. 1999).
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judgment in favor of the defendant." The Rousseaus appealed
this decision to the Rhode IslandSupreme Court.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDTNG
Before addressing Ferreira's argument that the economic loss
doctrine barred the Rousseaus' claim, the supreme court noted
that the privity of contract requirement in tort actions has been
abrogated in Rhode Island.' 3 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
has previously recognized that abrogation of the rule would expose
engineer subcontractors to third party liability. 14 The supreme
court then addressed the economic loss doctrine argument.' 5
The economic loss doctrine bars a plaintiff from recovering
purely economic damages in a tort action.' 6 The rationale is that:
the parties to a contract may allocate their risks by agree-
ment and do not need the special protections of tort law to
recover for damages caused by breach of contract. To recover
in tort, there must be a showing of harm above and beyond
disappointed commercial expectation, and thus the mere
existence of physical harm to other property should not make
a claim compensable in tort where the resultant harm flows
only from disappointed commercial expectations.' 7
In Boston Investment Property #1 State v. E.W. Burman,
Inc.,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied this rule to bar a
building purchaser from recovering economic damages from a de-
veloper.' 9 In Burman, the court reasoned that both parties were
sophisticated in commercial transactions, and possessed equal bar-
gaining power.20 Therefore, the plaintiffs disappointment was
foreseeable and protection by tort law would be inappropriate. 2'
The supreme court held that Ferreira's reliance on this case to
support his argument for application of the economic loss doctrine
11. See Rousseau, 727 A.2d. at 191.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 192 (citing Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543, 548 (R.I. 1985)).
14. See id. (citing Walsh, 494 A.2d at 548).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 26 (1997).
18. 658 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1995).
19. See Rousseau, 727 A.2d at 192 (citing Burman, 658 A.2d at 518).
20. See Burman, 658 A.2d at 517.
21. See id. at 517-18.
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was misplaced, and expressly limited the holding of Burman to
commercial transactions. 22 However, in the instant case, the
transaction between the Rousseaus and Ferreira was not commer-
cial in nature because the Rousseaus were consumer purchasers. 23
Since consumers are less experienced than commercial parties, the
justifications for allowing the harsh result of the ecomonic loss doc-
trine to fall on a party to the transaction are absent.2 4 Accord-
ingly, consumers should be afforded a greater degree of protection
against loss, even if that loss is purely economic. 25 Therefore, the
economic loss doctrine should not apply to consumer transactions.
CONCLUSION
In Rousseau v. K.N. Construction, Inc., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court limited the proper scope of the economic loss rule.
Since the doctrine should only be applied against parties to a
transaction that can adequately anticipate the economic ramifica-
tions of a deal gone bad, and therefore protect themselves in the
event of that contingency, it should apply only to commercial
transactions, and not to consumers.
Carly E. Beauvais
22. See Rousseau, 727 A.2d at 193.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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Tort Law. Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F. Supp.2d 70
(D.R.I. 1999). A prevailing party is not entitled to attorney's fees
under the Rhode Island Uniform Trade Secrets Act unless the pre-
vailing party can establish that the party claiming misappropria-
tion made the claim in subjective bad faith.
In Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Rhode Island determined that Rhode
Island law requires a finding of subjective bad faith before sanc-
tions can be imposed under the Rhode Island Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.2 Such a finding can be made from direct or circum-
stantial evidence. In addition, the court held that where a party
objects to a request for admission under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the objecting party cannot be sanctioned unless a mo-
tion to test the validity of the objection is filed by the discovering
party.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Ronald Russo (Russo) invented a new type of medical catheter
in 1989, while working for Superior Healthcare Corporation (Supe-
rior) under an arrangement where he received royalties based
upon the success of his inventions.3 David Brodsky, the President
of Superior, felt that his company lacked the ability to market such
a product, and sought Baxter Healthcare (Baxter) to fill that role.4
Baxter evaluated the product, and without informing Russo, sent
prototypes of the device to clinicians so they could conduct bench
trials.5 Baxter did not require that these clinicians sign confidenti-
ality agreements prior to involving them in the bench trials.6
Shortly thereafter, Russo stopped working for Superior over
issues not related to this action.7 However, he apparently retained
some access to Superior's offices, and noticed that they continued
to develop his catheter.8 In June of 1990, Russo learned that Supe-
1. 51 F. Supp.2d 70 (D.R.I. 1999).
2. R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-4 (1956) (1992 Reenactment).
3. See Russo, 51 F. Supp.2d at 73.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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rior and Baxter entered into an Exclusive Distribution Agreement
that granted Baxter an option to obtain rights in the catheter.9
Immediately following this discovery, Russo sent letters to
Baxter claiming that he held the rights to the catheter.' 0 He also
filed an application to patent the catheter with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office." Russo then filed suit against Su-
perior and Baxter, seeking an injunction to prevent the companies
from implementing the distribution agreement. 12
Thereafter, Baxter and Superior submitted their own applica-
tion for a patent.13 In addition, Baxter conducted additional field
trials, sending out samples of the device to hospitals, and not re-
quiring that they keep the catheter confidential. 14 Again, Russo
was not notified that the catheter had been sent out, this time to
the hospitals.' 5
In October of 1991, Russo's patent attorney, Robert Doherty,
received a notice of allowance from the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, and paid the issuance fee. 16 During the next month, Russo
discussed filing patent applications in foreign countries with Do-
herty. 17 In December 1991, Baxter displayed the catheter at a
trade show, during which time it took sales leads on the catheter
and included it in Baxter's sales brochure.'5 Russo had not author-
ized those activities and did not learn about them until several
days after the show.19 Russo immediately told Doherty about
these findings, although Russo did not know about the earlier
bench trials.20
Doherty advised Russo that Baxter's disclosures at the trade
show had destroyed the novelty of his invention and made it un-
patentable in any foreign country.2 ' He further advised that no
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 73-74.
14. See id. at 74.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. Doherty did tell Russo that foreign patents were a possibility in
Canada and Australia. See id.
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foreign patent applications should even be filed because he be-
lieved that no patents could issue after Baxter's publication at the
show, or that any patents that might issue would be invalid.22
Despite the fact that he advised Russo to abandon all hope of
acquiring a foreign patent, Doherty did not research the issue or
consult an attorney specializing in foreign patents.23 Unfortu-
nately for Russo, Doherty's legal advice was incorrect. 24 However,
Russo relied upon Doherty's incorrect advice and decided not to
seek foreign patents.25 In early 1992, the Patent and Trademark
Office issued Russo a patent, which unquestionably barred Russo
from obtaining any foreign patents.26
In October of 1994, Russo filed suit against Baxter, alleging
that Baxter's publication of the catheter at the 1991 trade show
barred Russo from obtaining a foreign patent.27 Russo amended
his complaint after he learned in discovery that Baxter had previ-
ously publicized the catheter in the bench trials and field tests.28
Russo based his complaint on the Rhode Island Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (RIUTSA).29
At trial, Baxter moved for judgment as a matter of law under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) at the close of Russo's case.30
Baxter's motion was granted on the grounds that Russo did not
show "that Baxter had either caused his injury or disclosed his
trade secret."31
Thereafter, Baxter moved for an award of attorney's fees.
Baxter argued that it was entitled to attorney's fees on two
grounds. 32 First, Baxter argued that Russo filed suit in bad faith
under the RIUTSA, and second that Russo failed to admit the
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. In fact, Russo's foreign patent applications would have been
barred only if Russo failed to file the application until six months after the date of
disclosure. Therefore, Russo's applications would have been timely as long as they
were filed before early June, six months from the December 9, 1991 trade show
date. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 75.
28. See id.
29. R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-4 (1956) (1992 Reenactment).
30. See Russo, 51 F. Supp.2d at 75.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 73.
2000] 827
828 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601
truth of matters contained in several requests for admissions.33
On December 2, 1998, a magistrate denied Baxter's motion in part
and granted it in part, and both parties appealed that decision. 34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In order to receive attorney's fees under the RIUTSA, the pre-
vailing party must show that "a claim of misappropriation is made
in bad faith."35 The court noted that because it had diversity juris-
diction over the instant case, Rhode Island law guided the court's
interpretation of "bad faith."3 6 The court also noted that no cases
decided under the RIUTSA had previously interpreted the term
"bad faith."37 Therefore, the court looked to Rhode Island Supreme
Court cases for analogies.38
The Rhode Island Supreme Court uses a subjective test for bad
faith.39 In Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross,40 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that subjective bad faith cannot exist if the claimant
reasonably believes that the claim has a legal and factual basis.41
However, a court can rely on circumstantial evidence to find bad
faith.42
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land held that under Rhode Island law, a court must find subjec-
tive bad faith before it can impose sanctions under the Rhode
Island Uniform Trade Secrets Act.43 Here, there was ample direct
evidence to suggest that Russo reasonably believed his claim had a
legal and factual basis.44 Summary judgment had twice been de-
nied to Baxter, and the district court believed the case should go to
trial.45 Furthermore, there was direct evidence at trial that Russo
was surprised by the fact that Doherty did no research on foreign
patents before advising Russo not to pursue filing an application.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 76 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-4 (1956) (1992 Reenactment)).
36, See id. at 75-76.
37. See id. at 76.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. 477 A.2d 939 (R.I. 1993).
41. See id. at 944.
42. See Russo, 51 F. Supp.2d at 76.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 77.
45. See id.
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This direct evidence was sufficient to evidence the absence of sub-
jective bad faith on Russo's part, and also defeats Baxter's argu-
ment that bad faith could be inferred from the absence of proof
presented by Russo at trial.46 Russo acted in good faith, and was
entitled to have the court evaluate his claims even though he was
ultimately unsuccessful. 47
The court then held that Baxter was not entitled to attorney's
fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2). 48 Rule 37
(c)(2) provides that sanctions can be imposed if a party fails to ad-
mit the truth of a matter and the requesting party later proves the
matter to be true.49 However, the burden is on the requesting
party to compel a response where the other party objects to the
request.50
Here, Russo objected to one of Baxter's requests for admission,
but Baxter never sought to compel a response from Russo. The
court concluded that sanctions should not be imposed on the ob-
jecting party unless the requesting party moves to "test the valid-
ity of the objection." 51 Otherwise, sanctions could be imposed on
an objecting party even if the objection had merit.52
CONCLUSION
In Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island held sanctions cannot be im-
posed under the Rhode Island Uniform Trade Secret Act absent a
finding of subjective bad faith. Under Rhode Island law, a claim-
ant's reasonable belief that there is a legal and factual basis for his
claim must be evaluated before the court can determine whether
46. See id. The court stated that while bad faith can be inferred from a party's
failure to prove its claim where reasonable investigation would have discovered
the flaw in the party's case, such recourse is not necessary where there is direct
evidence of lack of bad faith. See id. (citing VSL Corp. v. General Tech., Inc., 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1356, 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 79.
49. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2).
50. Russo, 51 F. Supp.2d at 78.
51. Id.
52. See id.
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the claimant filed a misappropriation claim in bad faith. However,
bad faith can be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Sarah K. Heaslip
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Tort Law. Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713
(R.I. 1999). During an ongoing snowstorm, a business invitor's
duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for his
invitees is suspended until the storm has ended. However, where
unusual circumstances are present, the duty to remove snow and
ice will not be suspended.
In Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc.,' the Rhode Island
Supreme Court approved the use of the "Connecticut Rule," which
permits a landlord or business invitor to wait a reasonable period
of time after a storm clears to maintain in a reasonably safe condi-
tion the portion of its business premises expected to be used by
invitees. However, the court held that where a customer was or-
dered to retrieve her car from 100 feet behind the company's prem-
ises, unusual circumstances existed and prevented the
postponement of the business invitor's duty to maintain the prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition. 2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 9, 1991, in the snow and freezing rain, the plain-
tiff parked her automobile in front of the defendant's shop in order
that it could be repaired.3 The plaintiff returned at approximately
4:00 p.m., in the inclement weather, to retrieve her automobile. 4
At that time she could not see her automobile, but was told by one
of the employees that it was located 100 feet behind the defend-
ant's premises and that she could retrieve it there.5 After being
instructed to be careful due to the icy conditions, she walked out to
her car and slipped and fell. 6 As a result, she filed a civil action in
superior court for damages. 7
Following the presentation of the plaintiffs case to a jury, the
defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law.8 The trial jus-
tice granted the motion, relying on Fuller v. Housing Authority.9
1. 732 A.2d 713 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 717.
3. See id. at 714.
4. See id. at 714-15.
5. See id. at 715.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. 279 A.2d 438 (R.I. 1971).
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The trial justice concluded that, according to Fuller, the defendant
did not owe an immediate duty to the plaintiff to shovel, ice, sand
or salt any of the premises in the middle of a storm, but could wait
a reasonable time after the storm had ceased before doing so.' 0
The plaintiff then filed an appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court first addressed whether or not the defend-
ant owed a duty to the plaintiff.12 Although the court acknowl-
edged that there is no clear-cut formula that can be applied to
resolve whether a duty exists in negligence cases,13 it concluded
that a business invitor does owe a duty to maintain the premises in
reasonable condition for its invitees. 14 The court came to this con-
clusion by deciding that the "Connecticut Rule" adopted in Fuller
extends beyond a landlord-tenant situation to a business invitor-
invitee situation. 15 In Fuller, the court held that "during a snow
storm, a landlord has no immediate duty to shovel snow, or remove
or salt and sand ice, because such duty is postponed for at least a
reasonable period after the storm has abated."16
The court next determined whether any unusual circum-
stances existed which served to remove the postponement of de-
fendant's duty to remove snow and ice. 17 The court concluded that
because the plaintiff's automobile was not where she left it and the
defendant knew the path from his building to where he parked the
car 100 feet behind his premises was icy, an unusual circumstance
did arise.' In addition, because the defendant ordered the plain-
tiff to retrieve her car from the rear of his business premises 100
feet away, he exacerbated the situation.19 Therefore, the court
sustained the plaintiff's appeal, vacated the superior court's judg-
10. See Terry, 732 A.2d at 715.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. (citing Kenney Mfg. Co. v. Starkweather & Shepley, Inc., 643 A.2d
203, 206 (R.I. 1994); Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994)).
14. See id. at 716.
15. See id. at 716-17.
16. See id. at 716 (citing Fuller, 279 A.2d at 441).
17. See id. at 717.
18. See id. at 717-18.
19. See id. at 718.
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ment, and ordered a new trial so that the law could be applied
properly. 20
CONCUTSTON
In Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court expanded the definition and scope of the "Connecti-
cut Rule" previously adopted in Rhode Island. The court held that
although the "Connecticut Rule" allows a landlord or business in-
vitor to wait a reasonable time after the end of a storm to clear
snow, this duty will not be postponed where there are unusual cir-
cumstances. The court also held that the Connecticut Rule, which
originally only applied to landlord-tenant situations, is also appli-
cable to business invitor-invitee situations.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne
20. See id. at 718-19.
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